The riskiness of random processes is compared by (a) employing a decision-theoretic equivalence between processes and lotteries on pathspaces to identify the riskiness of the former with that of the latter, and (b) using the theory of comparative riskiness of lotteries over vector spaces to compare the riskiness of lotteries on a given path-space. We derive the equivalence used in step (a) and contribute a new criterion to the theory applied in step (b). The new criterion, involving a generalized form of second order stochastic dominance, is shown to be valid by establishing its equivalence to the standard decision-theoretic criterion. We demonstrate its tractability via diverse economic applications featuring risk embodied in random processes.
Introduction
The answer to the above question relies on the theory of comparative riskiness of lotteries. The cornerstone of this theory is the decision-theoretic criterion (henceforth, DTC): one lottery over a set of outcomes is said to be riskier than another one if every decision-maker with an admissible concave (Bernoulli-von Neumann-Morgenstern) utility defined on the outcomes derives at least as much expected utility from the latter as from the former. 1 The comparative riskiness of random variables can be assessed by identifying it with the comparative riskiness of their distributions on the real line and assessing the latter using DTC or its characterizations in Rothschild and Stiglitz [22] . This is a legitimate strategy because a decision-maker's expected utility is invariant with respect to the implied change of integrating variable (cf. equation (1)).
The proliferation of economic models with risk embodied in random processes (henceforth, processes) motivates the development of a theory for comparing the riskiness of processes, which can be used to study the effects of such risks on the endogenous variables of these models.
While the outcomes of a random variable are real numbers, the outcomes of a process, namely its sample paths, are real-valued (possibly, even vectorvalued) functions over a time domain. Since these functions belong to a path-space, which is a subset of a vector space, the strategy for comparing the riskiness of processes must suitably generalize the strategy for comparing the riskiness of random variables.
The first step of the strategy is to establish a duality, i.e., a decisiontheoretic equivalence, between processes and lotteries on path-spaces, so that the riskiness of a process can be legitimately identified with that of the lottery dual to it. This is done in Section 3. This duality allows seamless translation between processes and lotteries on path-spaces.
Since we regard DTC as the touchstone for a valid comparison of riskiness, the second step is to compare the riskiness of the dual lotteries on a path-space by using DTC or a criterion equivalent to it. Characterizations of DTC are important, if only because the tractability of different, albeit equivalent, criteria can vary with the applications. As most commonly used processes have infinite time domains, their path-spaces are embedded in various infinite-dimensional vector spaces. Therefore, a useful characterization of DTC must hold for as general a class of infinite-dimensional vector outcome spaces as possible. What is known about such characterizations?
The economics literature reveals no progress towards an answer since the Euclidean space results of Russell and Seo [23] . The other source of answers is the statistical literature on convex orders (surveyed in Mosler and Scarsini [17] , and more recently in Shaked and Shanthikumar [25] , Sections 3.A, 3.E, 7.A and 7.E) and comparison of experiments (surveyed in Le Cam [16] and Torgersen [29] ). This literature yields the two classical characterizations that are cited in Section 5.2 and stated in Appendix A. Neither DTC nor its classical characterizations have found traction in economic applications featuring random infinite-dimensional outcomes.
So, it is necessary to find a criterion that is equivalent to DTC in infinitedimensional settings and tractable in economic applications. Our main result, Theorem 6.3, provides a criterion that meets both requirements. This result characterizes DTC in terms of second order stochastic dominance applied to the utility distributions generated by the given lotteries over vector outcomes and the admissible utilities defined over these outcomes. Given any real vector space, the characterization holds for every measurable convex outcome space embedded in that vector space and every family of bounded, concave and measurable utilities on the outcomes that satisfies an easily verifiable closure property.
Special versions of this result require topological or ordering structure on the outcome space if the admissible utilities are to have continuity or monotonicity properties (Corollary 6.4). Since all the admissible families of utilities appearing in this literature satisfy the specified closure property, the result characterizes many familiar versions of DTC in a unified manner. In addition to our main result, Theorems 6.5-6.7 show that the vector outcomes theory generalizes various key features of the Rothschild-Stiglitz theory; for instance, comparisons of vector riskiness generate a partial ordering of the risks, imply mean-preservation and yield a comparison of the risk premia. While the scalar versions of these results are familiar, the vector versions are new, not merely because they hold for substantially more general settings, but also because these settings force conceptual innovations; see a synopsis of these results in Section 5. 3 and details in Sections 6.2-6.4.
When faced with a problem involving processes, it is tempting to try to finesse it by pathwise aggregating the sample paths, thereby deriving an aggregate random variable from each process. Thereafter, one might identify the comparative riskiness of processes with that of the corresponding aggregate random variables, where the latter comparison uses the RothschildStiglitz theory. Theorem 6.8 shows that this ploy is illegitimate: for, arguably, the largest class of vector outcome spaces that appear in economic models, the ordering of the riskiness of vector outcome lotteries using DTC is necessarily incongruent with the ordering of the riskiness of aggregate outcome distributions using the Rothschild-Stiglitz theory.
Since Theorems 6.3-6.8 hold for lotteries over appropriate vector outcome spaces, they necessarily hold for lotteries over appropriate path-spaces. Using the duality result, the latter versions of these theorems are readily translated into propositions regarding processes.
Finally, since our aim was to characterize DTC so as to facilitate applications, we demonstrate the tractability of the new criterion by using it to compare riskiness in economic applications where risk is embodied in processes. A typical economic application of the theory of comparative riskiness examines how variations in exogenously specified riskiness affect the choices made by a decision-maker seeking to maximize expected utility. Such decision-makers care about the riskiness of the primitive outcomes, namely the sample paths, only insofar as it affects the relationship between their decision and the distribution of the derived outcomes, namely the utilities. Using the classical criteria in these applications requires the translation of criteria based purely on the primitive outcomes into criteria based on the derived outcomes. Instead, our criterion is easier to use in these problems as it is based directly on the distributions of the derived outcomes. We substantiate this claim in Section 7, where we use our criterion to identify conditions under which the following results hold:
1. A bidder in a sealed-bid (first-price or second-price) auction will bid more conservatively with greater riskiness of the random process de-termining his valuation of the prize.
2. A regulated utility, which is penalized if it fails to meet a random demand flow over a period, will choose a higher capacity in response to greater riskiness of the demand process.
3. A firm's manager, who is incentivized to minimize stock-outs of its product, will choose a larger production capacity to deal with greater riskiness of the random orders process.
4. A risk averse investor will increase the risk-free component of his portfolio in response to increased riskiness of the stream of returns generated by the risky asset.
5
. A planner will provide more of a public good in response to greater riskiness of the consumption allocations of the citizens.
6. The principal's contribution in a team moral hazard situation increases with greater riskiness of the effort levels chosen by the agents.
Such problems have hitherto been modeled with real-outcome risks, but this surely was a concession to the available tool-kit, rather than an attempt at verisimilitude. At one level, our results simply confirm intuitions derived from the real outcomes theory. At another level, they use appropriate models and tools to convert conjectures into theorems.
All the applications are modeled with risk embodied in a process as the sole complication and other features pared down to be as elementary as possible without sacrificing economic substance. For instance, all the applications feature a real-valued decision variable. Applications featuring multi-dimensional controls or game-theoretic considerations are beyond the scope of this paper as their complexity demands longer dedicated treatments.
The contents of the sections not discussed above are as follows. Section 2 states our technical conventions. Section 4 recalls the Rothschild-Stiglitz theory. Section 5 states the formalism underlying the vector outcomes theory and uses it to catalog the relevant literature and our contributions to it. We conclude in Section 8. Appendix A states the classical equivalence results. Proofs of all results other than the main result are collected in Appendix B.
Notation and conventions
The following conventions shall apply throughout this paper.
¬P denotes the negation of proposition P . The subset relation ⊂ is used in the weak sense. N is the set of natural numbers. The real line is given the Euclidean metric topology. A product of topological spaces is given the product topology and a subset of a topological space is given the subspace topology. A topological space A is given the Borel σ-algebra B(A). For a topological space A, the set of continuous functions f : A → is denoted by C(A). ∆(A) denotes the set of lotteries, i.e., countably additive probability measures, on a measurable space (A, A). The distribution function corresponding to a lottery ν ∈ ∆( ) is given by F (., ν) = ν(−∞, .].
Every vector space is over the field . Let (X, ≥) be an ordered vector space. For x, y ∈ X, we say x > y if x ≥ y and ¬y ≥ x. For O ⊂ X, we say f : O → is increasing (resp. strictly increasing, decreasing) if x, y ∈ O and x > y implies f (
is the k-th derivative of f at x ∈ A. f (x+) (resp. f (x−)) is the right-hand (resp. lefthand) limit of f at x ∈ A.
Duality of processes and lotteries
In this section, we show that a process is dual to a lottery on its pathspace and the expected utility derived from a process is identical to the expected utility derived from its dual lottery. So, the problem of comparing the riskiness of processes is decision-theoretically equivalent to the problem of comparing the riskiness of their dual lotteries using DTC.
Given T ⊂ , let T be the set of functions x : T → . T is a vector space given (x + y)(.) := x(.) + y(.) and (rx)(.) := rx(.) for x, y ∈ T and r ∈ . A measurable space (O, O) is called a path-space if O ⊂ T . 2 Definition 3.1 A random process is a collection Y = (Ω, F, P ; T, y), where (Ω, F, P ) is a probability space, T ⊂ is the time domain and the function y : T × Ω → is such that y(t, .) is measurable for every t ∈ T . Each ω ∈ Ω generates the sample pathŷ(ω) ∈ T , given byŷ(ω)(.) := y(., ω).
The next definition links processes to lotteries on path-spaces by requiringŷ to be measurable, i.e., by requiring it to be a random element, which is the natural generalization of the notion of a random variable. Definition 3.2 A process Y = (Ω, F, P ; T, y) is said to be admissible with respect to a path-space
2 Consider a more general path-space O ⊂ Y T where Y is a vector space. Since Y T is a vector space, our main result will apply to O. However, we do not pursue this generality and restrict attention to Y = for simplicity and concreteness.
3 For instance, it is shown in Shah [24] that various Wiener-related processes and a large class of second order processes are admissible with respect to appropriate path-spaces.
Given a path-space, we declare processes to be equivalent if they are admissible with respect to it and generate the same distribution on it. Then, the mapping of the resulting equivalence classes of processes to their respective distributions on the path-space is automatically injective. We now show that, for an appropriate path-space, this mapping is also surjective. Definition 3.3 Consider a path-space (O, O). Let e : T × O → be the evaluation function defined by e(t, x) = x(t). We say that (O, O) is admissible if e(t, .) is measurable for every t ∈ T . Theorem 3.4 If a path-space (O, O) is admissible and P ∈ ∆(O), then P is the distribution of a process that is admissible with respect to (O, O).
So, if (O, O)
is an admissible path-space, then the mapping of equivalence classes of admissible processes to their respective distributions in ∆(O) is bijective. Moreover, an admissible process is decision-theoretically equivalent to its distribution on the path-space.
For the last claim, consider a process Y that is admissible with respect to a path-space (O, O). If u : O → is an integrable utility, then the change of variable formula (Billingsley [4] , Theorem 16.13) implies
i.e., expected utility is invariant across the dual representations of risk, where the left-hand side and the right-hand side of (1) are the expected utilities derived from the process and its distribution respectively. The above-described decision-theoretic duality justifies the identification of the riskiness of a process with the riskiness of its distribution. 
Real outcomes theory
As the real outcomes theory is the model for the vector outcomes theory of comparative riskiness, the latter seeks to emulate the key features of the former. In this section, we note these congruences and use them to interpret some modeling choices made in the more general theory.
Consider a convex set O ⊂ and lotteries µ, λ ∈ ∆(O). We say µR 1 λ if
for every function v : O → that is bounded, measurable and concave. R 1 is a special version of DTC (cf. Definition 5.3).
We say µR 2 λ if µ and λ have the same mean and λ second order stochastically dominates µ, i.e., (−∞,y] 
We say µR 3 λ if λ and µ are the distributions of random variables f and g respectively and the expectation of g conditional on f is equal to f almost surely (cf. Definitions A. 3 and A.4) .
The main result of the Rothschild-Stiglitz theory is: if O is a convex and compact subset of , then R 1 , R 2 and R 3 are identical partial orders (Rothschild and Stiglitz [22] , Theorem 2). Reflexivity implies that "riskier than" is meant in the weak sense. Incompleteness means that this theory does not rationalize any cardinal measure of riskiness. The partial order property is generalized to the vector outcomes setting in Theorem 6.5 and the equivalence of R 1 and R 3 is generalized in Theorem A.5.
The definitions of R 1 and R 3 do not call for the existence or knowledge of the means of µ and λ (cf. Definitions 5.3, A. 3 and A.4) , much less their equality. Nevertheless, as is well-known, µR 1 λ (resp. µR 3 λ) implies that µ and λ have the same mean (cf. Theorem 6.6). 4 It is also known that the risk premium attached to a lottery by a strictly increasing, concave and continuous utility increases with the riskiness of the lottery (cf. Theorem 6.7).
There is no presumption in R 1 that an admissible v must be monotonic; Equation (2) and Footnote 3 in Rothschild and Stiglitz [22] affirm this explicitly (cf. Definition 5.3). If the outcomes are known to be agreeable (resp. disagreeable) in a particular context, say monetary gains (resp. pain, prison terms, pollution), then it is sensible for v to be increasing (resp. decreasing) in that context. Or, a risk averse Goldilocks may have a concave utility that increases to a peak and then decreases. The absence of a monotonicity postulate admits many interpretations of the outcomes and the preferences. This agnosticism makes for a pure theory of comparative riskiness as its interpretation is independent of any particular context.
Insisting that the utilities underlying R 1 must be increasing restricts the theory's domain to risks that are sensibly reducible to "monetary" lotteries. The monotonicity requirement also confounds a decision-maker's attitude to risk with a preference for "more". To see this, consider lottery δ 0 (resp. δ 1 ) that gives prize 0 (resp. 1) almost surely. Every increasing utility, whether concave or otherwise, prefers δ 1 to δ 0 . So, if the definition of R 1 is amended to require that an admissible v must be increasing, in addition to the other requirements, then the amended criterion will declare δ 0 to be riskier than δ 1 . This unconvincing conclusion is driven purely by monotonicity and has nothing to do with risk aversion or risk. 4 The means exist as O is compact. To check their equality given µR1λ, set v = I and v = −I, where I is the identity mapping on O. Given µR3λ and the underlying probability space (Ω, F, P ), let E be the expectation operator and let E f g be the conditional expectation of g given f . Then,
In order to eliminate such anomalies, every version of R 1 that insists on increasing utilities also imposes mean-preservation as a prerequisite for comparable riskiness. This supplementary condition renders non-comparable the riskiness of δ 0 and δ 1 . R 1 reaches the same conclusion by admitting all concave utilities. Since admissible increasing and decreasing utilities imply contradictory assessments of δ 0 and δ 1 , their riskiness is non-comparable.
Vector outcomes theory
This section provides a formal synopsis of the theory of comparative riskiness of lotteries with vector outcomes.
Definitions
Definition 5.1 An outcome space is a pair (X, O), where O is a set of outcomes in a real vector space X. The theory uses the following specifications.
(1) O is a measurable convex subset of X.
(2) O is a convex subset of a topological vector space X. If an outcome space (X, O) satisfies specification (n) for n ∈ {1, . . . , 5}, then we say (X, O) belongs to Setting n and is admissible.
Given the conventions of Section 2, the settings are nested as follows:
So, if a definition or a proposition is valid for outcome spaces in Setting n ∈ {1, . . . , 4}, then it is also valid for outcome spaces in Setting n + 1. A subset of Setting n is specified by requiring X in that setting to be an ordered vector space. The resulting ordered settings satisfy a nesting scheme analogous to (2) .
Consider an admissible outcome space (X, O). Let V be the set of bounded, concave and measurable functions v :
Moreover, every v ∈ V is integrable with respect to every µ ∈ ∆(O). If X is topological, then let V c (resp. V sc ) be the set of continuous (resp. upper semicontinuous) functions in V . If X is ordered, then let V m (resp. V m c , V m sc ) be the set of increasing functions in V (resp. V c , V sc ).
Definition 5.2
Consider an admissible outcome space (X, O). V ⊂ V is said to be an admissible set of utilities with respect to (X, O) if it is well-defined, given the specified properties of (X, O), i.e., it is possible to determine for every v ∈ V , whether v ∈ V .
For instance, if (X, O) is an admissible outcome space without topological structure, then V is admissible with respect to (X, O), but V c and V sc are not admissible.
Definition 5.3
Consider an admissible outcome space (X, O). Let V ⊂ V be a set of utilities that is admissible with respect to (X, O). Given µ, λ ∈ ∆(O), we say
Relation V 1 is a version of DTC. The statement µ V 2 λ means that the utility distribution λ • v −1 second order stochastically dominates the utility distribution µ • v −1 for every admissible utility v ∈ V .
We end this section by relating concavity and risk aversion in the context of the above formalism. Given an admissible outcome space (X, O), consider a bounded and measurable utility v : O → . Utility v is said to be risk If (X, O) belongs to Setting 5 with X = n and
where π i : n → is the i-th projection mapping, then m µ has the requisite properties and v is risk averse if and only if v ∈ V (Perlman [19] , Proposition 1.1). More generally, our results in Section 6.3 point to the Pettis (or weak) mean as the appropriate definition of m µ in Setting 3. In this setting, if m µ is the Pettis mean and v is upper semicontinuous, then m µ has the requisite properties (Theorem 6.6) and v is risk averse if and only if v ∈ V sc (Perlman [19] , Theorem 3.10). Settings 1 and 2 lack the structure to ensure that m µ has the requisite properties. Therefore, in these general settings, concavity serves as an abstract representation of risk aversion. It is also known that into valid measures of riskiness, the restriction of the result to Setting 5 means that it cannot be used to compare the riskiness of processes with infinite time domains, which is our primary motivation.
The known results
Our results will resolve both these issues.
Summary of our theoretical results
Our main result is the omnibus Theorem 6.3: given an admissible setting (X, O), if a set of functions V ⊂ V is admissible with respect to (X, O) and satisfies the "closure property", then V 1 = V 2 . Corollary 6.4 interprets V in this equality as various familiar admissible sets of utilities.
For outcome spaces in Setting 1, the equality holds for V = V . While relation V 1 is the broadest version of DTC and the verbatim extension of R 1 , relation V 2 generalizes the Russell-Seo relation
2 . This result characterizes DTC in the most general possible setting.
For outcome spaces in Setting 2, the equality holds for V ∈ {V c , V sc }.
Using (2) and setting V = V c , We also derive the following three results that generalize the corresponding results flowing from the Rothschild-Stiglitz theory.
For an outcome space (X, O) in Setting 1, Theorem 6.5 shows that V 1 imposes a partial order on the quotient set of equivalence classes generated by a natural notion of identically risky lotteries in ∆(O). This generalizes the Rothschild-Stiglitz result that R 1 imposes a partial order on ∆(O).
For an outcome space in Setting 3, Theorem 6.6 shows that each lottery must have a unique Pettis mean, and if one lottery is riskier than another in terms of Vc 1 , then their Pettis means must be the same. So, Pettis mean-preservation is a natural consequence of purely decision-theoretic considerations when monotonicity is not imposed on admissible preferences. This also suggests that the Pettis mean is the appropriate notion of the "mean" if mean-preservation is to be imposed as a supplementary restriction in vector outcome settings. This result generalizes the Rothschild-Stiglitz mean-preservation property derived in Footnote 4.
For an outcome space (X, O) in Setting 3, if X is ordered and one lottery is riskier than another, then Theorem 6.7 shows that, for every continuous, concave and strictly increasing utility, the set of risk premia associated with the riskier lottery must be "greater than" the set of risk premia associated with the less risky lottery.
We show in Theorem 6.8 that the need for a vector outcomes theory of comparative riskiness cannot be finessed by using the real outcomes theory to compare random aggregate outcomes. This issue is peculiar to the vector outcomes theory and cannot arise in the real outcomes theory.
6 Our theoretical results
Equivalence
Let U be the set of functions u(., y) : → , where y ∈ and u(., y) = min{., y}. Each u ∈ U is increasing, concave, continuous and measurable.
Let (X, O) be an admissible setting and let V ⊂ V be a set of functions that is admissible with respect to (X, O). V is said to be closed under U if u • v ∈ V for all u ∈ U and v ∈ V . Next, we perform an elementary calculation leading to our main result.
The following characterization of such a V might be of interest although we do not use it; see Howie [13] for these concepts. Clearly, (U, •) is a semigroup. Each f ∈ U yields the transformation
This yields our main result. 
This result yields a category of concrete equivalence results regarding the various criteria for comparing vector outcome riskiness. 
Proof. 
Partial ordering
It is well-known that V 1 yields a partial order on ∆(O) for an outcome space (X, O) in Setting 5 with X = . We generalize this result to Setting 1. The generalization is not verbatim, but such that it reduces to the classical result in the appropriate setting.
Consider an admissible outcome space (X, O). We say that µ, λ ∈ ∆(O) are risk-equivalent, denoted by µ ∼ λ, if µ•v −1 = λ•v −1 for every v ∈ V , i.e., the utility distributions µ•v −1 and λ•v −1 are identical for every v ∈ V . This is a sensible notion because risk-equivalent lotteries are identical for every risk averse decision-maker. The quotient set ∆(O)/∼ consists of equivalence
Consider an outcome space (X, O) in Setting 5 with X = . Then, the identity function I ∈ V ; this holds only when
So, every equivalence class in ∆(O)/∼ is a singleton set. Thus, in the Rothschild-Stiglitz setting, reduces to V 1 and Theorem 6.5 reduces to the classical result. Consider an outcome space (X, O) in Setting 1, where O is a path-space. Using Definition 3.5 and Theorem 6.5, it follows that also induces a partial order on the quotient set consisting of equivalence classes of processes admissible with respect to (O, O), where processes are declared to be equivalent if their distributions are risk-equivalent.
Mean-preservation
It was noted in Footnote 4 that µR 1 λ implies that µ and λ have the same real mean. This property can be generalized very substantially to a relation representing DTC in Setting 3.
Consider an outcome space (X, O) in Setting 3. The problems in doing the generalization are: (a) to define the mean of µ ∈ ∆(O), i.e., to give meaning to the vector integral m µ := O µ(dx) x, (b) show that m µ exists, and (c) show that it is unique. Let X * be the set of continuous linear functionals on X. We say that
The vector m µ is the Pettis integral (Pettis [20] ) of the identity function on O, which may also be denoted by O µ(dx) x.
For instance, if X = n , then the projections {π 1 , . . . , π n } are a basis for X * and m µ is the familiar coordinate-wise mean; if n = 1, then m µ coincides with the familiar (strong) mean O µ(dx) x.
The following is a generalized mean-preservation property. This result has implications for risks embodied in processes. Suppose
Risk premia
We now relate the riskiness of lotteries to their risk premia in Setting 3. By Theorem 6.6, every µ ∈ ∆(O) has a Pettis mean m µ ∈ O. Given v ∈ V , the set of risk premia corresponding to lottery
Given an ordered vector space (X, ≥), we say that A ≥ * B for nonempty sets A, B ∈ 2 X if ¬a < b for all a ∈ A and b ∈ B. If
is an admissible process with respect to (O, O) for i ∈ {1, 2} and Y 1 is riskier than Y 2 , i.e., P 1 •ŷ
for every strictly increasing function v ∈ V c .
Aggregation
The theory developed above is sufficient for comparing the riskiness of vector outcome lotteries. But, is it necessary?
Consider an admissible setting (X, O). One might attempt to finesse the problem of comparing the riskiness of lotteries in ∆(O) as follows. First, convert vector outcomes into real outcomes using a measurable aggregator 6 The Pettis mean may have a pointwise representation in this case. For t ∈ T , if the evaluation e(t, .) : X → is continuous, then e(t, .) ∈ X * , and consequently,
Not only does aggregation necessarily yield an incorrect comparison of vector outcome riskiness, it also eliminates interesting substantive aspects of the problem.
For instance, in the problem studied in Section 7.6, aggregation of outcomes would mean resorting to a representative agent and a composite good, thereby suppressing substantive features such as the nature of an agent's preference over allocation vectors and the nature of the planner's preference over profiles of individual utilities and allocations.
Another example is a model where a stream of returns is replaced by a single number, possibly the stream's present value. This compression of outcomes would rob the model of various features of the returns process that could be relevant for preferences, such as volatility, the maximum and minimum processes and various passage times.
Applications
We demonstrate in Sections 7.2-7.7 that the theory developed in Section 6 can be used to study a variety of economic applications involving risk embodied in processes. The applications use Theorems 7.1 and 7.2 to predict how a decision-maker's behavior varies with the riskiness of vector outcomes. Theorem 7.1 generalizes an analogous result in Diamond and Stiglitz [8] .
Comparative statics
Consider an admissible outcome space (X, O), v ∈ V with v 0 < v 1 , and a family of lotteries {µ(r) ∈ ∆(O) | r ∈ } where riskiness increases with r ∈ [0, 1], i.e., r 1 , r 2 ∈ [0, 1] and r 2 > r 1 implies µ(r 2 ) V 2 µ(r 1 ).
Consider u : 2 → and C = [a, b] ⊂ with a < b. C is the decisionmaker's choice space. If x ∈ O is the random outcome and the decisionmaker chooses c ∈ C, then the resulting utility is u(v(x), c).
is the lottery generating the random outcome and the decision-maker chooses c ∈ C, then U (r, c) is the expected utility.
The following is a specialized version of Theorem 7.1. In order to avoid repetition of the above formalism, we assert here that all the applications in Sections 7.2-7.7 will satisfy the hypotheses of Theorem 7.1, and in some cases, Theorem 7.2. Most hypothesized properties will simply be postulated, but others will be derived from the specific structure of each problem.
Auctions with valuation risk
We predict the behavior of bidder 1 (henceforth, "the buyer") in first-price and second-price sealed bid auctions when the buyer's valuation of the prize is determined by a risky vector outcome. For concreteness, let the prize be a natural resource concession and let the risky outcomes refer to the sample paths of a process of returns from the concession; by Theorem 6.8, such vector risks cannot be legitimately reduced to aggregate real risks.
Consider an admissible outcome space (X, O) where (O, O) is an admissible path-space. For the parameter r ∈ [0, 1], let the prize yield a random process Y(r) = (Ω, F, P (r); T, y) that is admissible with respect to (O, O). Let µ(r) ∈ ∆(O) be the distribution generated by Y(r).
Given x ∈ O, let f • v(x) be the buyer's gross payoff, where v ∈ V and f satisfies the conditions listed in Theorem 7.2. 7 Given r ∈ [0, 1], the buyer's expected gross payoff, conditional on winning the prize, is O µ(r)(dx) f • v(x). If the buyer's probability of winning the prize is c ∈ C := [0, 1], then the buyer's expected gross payoff is c O µ(r)(dx) f • v(x). Let e(c) be the minimum expected cost of bidding to ensure a minimum winning probability c. The buyer's expected net payoff from choosing c is O µ(r)(dx) u(v(x), c), (v(x), .) . If e satisfies the conditions of Theorem 7.2, then Dc(r) ≤ 0, i.e., greater riskiness of the outcome induces the buyer to choose a lower winning probability. It only remains to derive e and show that it satisfies the conditions of Theorem 7.2.
Given bids (y 2 , . . . , y n ) by the other bidders, let y * = max{y 2 , . . . , y n }. The buyer wins the prize by bidding b if and only if y * ≤ b; for simplicity, we break ties in favor of the buyer. If the buyer wins, then he pays b in a first-price auction and y * in a second-price auction; otherwise, the buyer pays nothing.
Let G be the distribution function of y * with 0 ≤ β 0 < β 1 < ∞, where β 0 = sup G −1 ({0}) and β 1 = inf G −1 ({1}); naturally, G is derived from the buyer's belief about the bidding behavior of the other bidders. If the buyer bids b ∈ , then he wins with probability G(b). Define b : C → by
is the lowest bid by the buyer that implements c, i.e., yields a winning probability greater than or equal to c.
Lemma 7.3 The function b is nonnegative, bounded, increasing, measurable and left-continuous.
There is a simple duality between G and b. 
Using Lemma 7.3, g : C →
is nonnegative, bounded and increasing. Therefore, it is integrable. In general, g is neither continuous, nor strictly increasing, nor convex. For instance, let G = 1 [1,∞) on . Then, b = 1 (0,1] on C. Consequently, g = 1 (0,1] on C for both auction forms, which is discontinuous and not strictly increasing. As g(1/2) = 1 > 1/2 = g(1)/2 + g(0)/2, g is not convex. However, g is more regular in some circumstances.
Lemma 7.5 If G is strictly increasing on [β 0 , β 1 ] and continuous, then g is continuous for the first-price and the second-price auctions.
While g(c) is the least expected cost of implementing c with a deterministic bid, namely b(c), the buyer may reduce the expected cost by randomly implementing c. This amounts to picking a winning probability by using a lottery over C with mean c. The randomization has no effect on the buyer's gross payoff as it is linear in c. We now derive the random implementation of c that minimizes the expected cost of doing so and show that the resulting cost function e : C → satisfies the conditions of Theorem 7.2.
Suppose the buyer chooses a lottery λ ∈ ∆(C). The resulting expected winning probability is m λ := C λ(dx) x and the expected cost is L(λ) := C λ(dx) g(x). As g is nonnegative and bounded, so is L. The set of random implementations of c is ∆(C, c) = {λ ∈ ∆(C) | m λ = c}, while e(c) := inf{L(λ) | λ ∈ ∆(C, c)} is the minimum expected cost of implementing c. Deriving e is a straightforward matter in special circumstances.
Suppose g is convex. Consider c ∈ C and λ ∈ ∆(C, c). As g is convex,
Suppose g is continuous. As C is a compact metric space, so is ∆(C) when given the weak* topology (Parthasarathy [18] , Theorem II.6.4); see Footnote 10 for more on this topology. By the definition of this topology, L is continuous. If ∆(C, c) is compact, then there exists λ ∈ ∆(C, c) such that e(c) = L(λ). To show that ∆(C, c) is compact, it suffices to show that it is a closed subset of ∆(C). Let λ ∈ ∆(C) be an accumulation point of ∆(C, c). Then, there is a sequence (λ n ) ⊂ ∆(C, c) converging to λ. As the identity mapping on C is continuous, m λ = lim n m λn = c. So, λ ∈ ∆(C, c) and ∆(C, c) is a closed subset of ∆(C), as required.
However, as g may be non-convex and discontinuous, the above arguments do not suffice. A general approach is required to derive e without relying on supplementary assumptions regarding g.
The general approach replaces ∆(C) with the larger set ∆(C) * consisting of finitely additive lotteries on C. This change has to be accompanied by other modifications: the integrals in the definitions of m λ and L(λ) are now interpreted as Dunford-Schwartz integrals for λ ∈ ∆(C) * and we set ∆(C, c) * := {λ ∈ ∆(C) * | m λ = c} and e(c) :
Lemma 7.6 If e(c) = inf{L(λ) | λ ∈ ∆(C, c) * } for c ∈ C, then (A) e(c) = L(λ) ∈ for some λ ∈ ∆(C, c) * , and (B) e : C → is nonnegative, bounded, increasing, convex, continuous on (0, 1) and twice differentiable Lebesgue almost everywhere.
So, e is well-defined and well-behaved as per the requirements of Theorem 7.2. Hence, Dc(.) ≤ 0 Lebesgue almost everywhere on [0, 1].
Size of regulated utility
Consider an electric utility that is required by the regulator to meet the random demand flow over the period T = [0, 1]. Failure to do so attracts a penalty. The firm chooses the instantaneous production capacity at time 0, which cannot be adjusted thereafter. Its revenue from the sale of electricity and its variable cost are internalized by the regulator via a transfer of the net amountà la Laffont and Tirole [14] . In addition, the firm receives a sufficiently large lump-sum return for participating in this arrangement. Given this set-up, the firm chooses capacity to minimize the sum of the fixed cost and the expected penalty. We show that the chosen capacity increases with the riskiness of the demand process.
We begin with the formal set-up of the firm's problem. Let X = C(T ). Given γ > 0, let O be a convex subset of X with 0 ∈ O and x(T ) ⊂ [0, γ] for every x ∈ O. The demand for electricity is generated by the random process Y(r) = (O, B(O), µ(r); T, e), where e : T × O → is the evaluation function. So, e(t, x) = x(t) ∈ [0, γ] is the instantaneous demand at time t generated by the continuous sample path x. The distribution induced by Y(r) on its sample paths is µ(r), with the interpretation that its riskiness increases with parameter r ∈ [0, 1].
Let C = [a, b] be the set of capacity choices with a ∈ (0, γ). Given a demand path x ∈ O and capacity c ∈ C, w(x) = sup x(T ) is the largest instantaneous demand over T and max{x(t) − c, 0} is the instantaneous deficit at time t. So, the largest instantaneous deficit over T is sup t∈T max{x(t) − c, 0} = max{sup x(T ) − c, 0} = max{w(x) − c, 0}.
Suppose the firm pays a penalty based on the largest instantaneous deficit over T . Given a demand path x ∈ O and capacity c ∈ C, the penalty is P (max{w(x) − c, 0}), where P : → is a C 3 function with P (x) = 0 for x ≤ 0 and DP, D 2 P, D 3 P ≥ 0. Thus, idle capacity is neither rewarded, ford and Schwartz [10] , Chapter III) are defined with respect to finitely additive lotteries. 9 Clearly, e(c) ≥ inf{L(λ) | λ ∈ ∆(C) * ∧ m λ ≥ c}. Consider λ ∈ ∆(C) * with m λ > c ≥ 0. As c/m λ < 1, h(x) = xc/m λ yields the function h : C → C. It follows that
nor penalized, and penalties increase in severity with the maximum instantaneous deficit. Let S : → generate the cost S(c) of setting-up capacity c ∈ C. Suppose S is C 3 and D 2 S > 0. Given r ∈ [0, 1], suppose capacity c = c(r) ∈ (a, b) minimizes the firm's expected cost O µ(r)(dx) P (max{w(x)−c, 0})+S(c) over C. We show that, if r 1 , r 2 ∈ [0, 1] and r 1 > r 2 , then c(r 1 ) ≥ c(r 2 ).
We first justify referring to Y(r) as a process. Since X and O do not have measurability structure, we first endow X with the compact-open topology. As T is compact, this topology coincides with the topology of uniform convergence (Dugundji [9] , Theorem XII.8.2). By Theorem XII.2.4 in Dugundji [9] , e is continuous. Consequently, e(t, .) is continuous, and therefore Borel measurable, for every t ∈ T . So, Y(r) is indeed a process.
It is easily verified that w : O → is convex and bounded. For every ∞) ) is open in O as e is continuous. Thus, w is lower semicontinuous. Therefore, w is Borel measurable.
So,
over C, where u : 2 → is given by u(v, c) = −S(c)−P •(I −g)(−v−c) and I is the identity mapping. Although this problem resembles the problem of Theorem 7.1, we cannot apply this theorem directly as u is not sufficiently regular. Our indirect method for analyzing c(.) proceeds in three steps.
1. We uniformly approximate g by a sequence (g n ) of smooth functions.
Each g n generates a uniform approximation u n of u over the set v(O)× C. Each u n generates an approximate version of the firm's problem and a solution c(.; n) of this approximate problem.
2. We use Theorem 7.1 to show that c(r 1 ; n) ≥ c(r 2 ; n) for all n ∈ N and r 1 , r 2 ∈ [0, 1] with r 1 > r 2 .
3. We generate cluster points c * (r 1 ) and c * (r 2 ) of the sequences (c(r 1 ; n)) and (c(r 2 ; n)) respectively, and show that c(r 1 ) = c * (r 1 ) ≥ c * (r 2 ) = c(r 2 ), as required.
The following approximation is the key to the first step. It is derived by smoothly pasting smooth functions over various parts of the domain.
Lemma 7.7 Consider b ∈ and > 0. If u : → is given by u(x) = min{x−b, 0}, then there exists a concave, increasing
Fix N ∈ N such that 2/N < a and consider n ≥ N . Lemma 7.7 implies that there exists a concave, increasing C ∞ function g n : → such that sup{|g n (x) − g(x)| | x ∈ } ≤ 1/n, g n ≥ g, Dg n = 1 on (−∞, −2/n], Dg n ∈ (0, 1) on (−2/n, 0) and g n = Dg n = 0 on + . Set g n = g N for n < N . Given n ∈ N , define u n : 2 → by u n (v, c) = −S(c) − P • (I − g n )(−v − c). Clearly, u n is C 3 . The following result completes the first step.
Lemma 7.8 The sequence (u n ) converges uniformly to u on v(O) × C.
Let c(r; n) ∈ (a, b) maximize U (r, .; n) := O µ(r)(dx) u n (v(x), .) over C for r ∈ [0, 1] and n ∈ N . The next result completes the second step.
Lemma 7.9
If n ≥ N , r 1 , r 2 ∈ and r 1 > r 2 , then c(r 1 ; n) ≥ c(r 2 ; n).
As C is compact, the Bolzano-Weierstrass property implies the existence of subsequences (c(r 1 , j)) ⊂ (c(r 1 , n)) and (c(r 2 , j)) ⊂ (c(r 2 , n)) converging to c * (r 1 ) ∈ C and c * (r 2 ) ∈ C respectively. By the above arguments, c(r 1 ; j) ≥ c(r 2 ; j) for all but a finite set of j. Consequently, c * (r 1 ) ≥ c * (r 2 ).
Lemma 7.10 For r ∈ {r 1 , r 2 }, c * (r) maximizes U (r, .) over C.
As U (r, .) is strictly concave, its maximum over C is unique. Therefore, Lemma 7.10 implies c(r 1 ) = c * (r 1 ) ≥ c * (r 2 ) = c(r 2 ), as claimed.
Optimal inventory management
The previous section featured the problem of managing the production of a non-durable commodity. The same formalism can be applied to the problem of managing the inventory of a durable commodity. Since the formal analysis is identical, we shall only re-interpret the formalism of Section 7.3.
Consider a firm that produces a durable commodity. Let ct, with c > 0, be the firm's output over the period [0, t]. Let D(t) be the total orders that arrive over the period [0, t] . So, the stock-out at time t is max{D(t) − ct, 0}. In order to discourage stock-outs, the firm imposes a penalty on the manager, which depends on the largest time-average of stock-outs over the period T = [0, 1]. Thus, the penalty is based on sup t∈T max{D(t)/t − c, 0}.
The manager's instrument for controlling stock-outs is the production parameter c. The manager has to pay cost S(c) for choosing c.
Let T , X, O, w, C, P , S and Y(r) be as specified in Section 7.3. The only change is that Y(r) now represents the firm's time-average of orders flow, i.e., e(x, t) = x(t) = D(t)/t for t ∈ T and x ∈ O.
Given r ∈ [0, 1], suppose the production technology c = c(r) ∈ (a, b) minimizes the manager's expected penalty O µ(r)(dx) P (max{w(x) − c, 0}) + S(c) over C. As shown in Section 7.3, if r 1 , r 2 ∈ [0, 1] and r 1 > r 2 , then c(r 1 ) ≥ c(r 2 ), i.e., greater riskiness of the time-average of orders process induces the manager to choose a higher production rate.
Portfolio choice
Consider an investor with wealth 0 who invests in a risky asset with market value 1. A share c ∈ C := [0, 1] of the asset costs c and yields a share c of the random dividends from it that arrive over the period T = [0, 1]. Let the sample paths of the dividend process belong to O ⊂ X := C(T ). A sample path x ∈ O yields dividend x(t) at time t ∈ T . Let v ∈ V be the statistic used by the investor to evaluate sample paths. We assume that v is homogeneous of degree 1. Examples of v include v(x) = x(τ ) for some τ ∈ T , v(x) = inf x(T ) and v(x) = T dt e −δt x(t).
Given c ∈ C and x ∈ O, the investor receives the dividend path cx. The resulting gross payoff, f (v(cx) − cv 1 ) = f (c(v(x) − v 1 )), depends on the variation from the reference statistical evaluation v 1 . Let f : → be C 3 with Df > 0, D 2 f < 0 and
The investor's purchase of a share c is financed by selling Q(c) bonds at price c/Q(c). Each bond yields a gross return α > 0 at time 1.
Given 0 < β < γ, let G : [β, γ] → be the demand function for the investor's bonds; if the bond price is p, then G(p) is the number of bonds sold. Suppose G is C 2 , with G(β) = 1/β, G(γ) = 0, DG < 0, D 2 G < 0 and G(β) + βDG(β) < 0. Then, there is a unique C 2 implicit function P : C → [β, γ] such that c = G(P (c))P (c) for every c ∈ C. This implies P (0) = γ, P (1) = β, P > 0, DP < 0 and D 2 P < 0. Setting Q = G • P , it follows that Q is C 2 , with Q ≥ 0, DQ > 0 and D 2 Q > 0. So, a share c of the risky asset is financed by selling Q(c) bonds at price P (c).
The investor's net payoff is generated by the function u :
As
0) = 0, Theorem 7.1 implies that Dc(r) ≤ 0, i.e., greater riskiness of the asset implies a smaller investment in it by the investor.
Allocation of a public good
We study a planner's problem of using a given resource to provide a periodspecific public good in each of two periods, say 1 and 2. More precisely, the two goods are excludable across periods but each period-specific good is non-excludable and non-rival within the relevant period.
Let I be a finite set of agents. An agent's allocation in a period consists of the period-specific public good provided by the planner and a vector of other period-specific goods. The planner's resource constraint is modeled by interpreting φ(c) ∈ + as the maximum amount of the public good that the planner can provide in period 1 if c ∈ C ⊂ + is the amount of the public good to be supplied in period 2. The allocation of other goods in period 1 is determined by a known outcome y ∈ O and the corresponding allocation in period 2 is determined by a randomly generated outcome x ∈ O.
Given outcomes x, y ∈ O and the planner's decision c ∈ C, the aggregate social welfare is w(v(y), φ(c)) + w(v(x), c), where v : O → is the function used by the planner to evaluate outcomes in O. Since y is given, we suppress it and set ψ(c) = −w(v(y), φ(c)). Therefore, the social welfare function
If the period 2 outcome is x ∈ O and the planner's decision is c ∈ C, then social welfare is
We consider alternative specifications of X, O, x and v and analyze how the optimal c varies with the riskiness of x.
In the next example, instead of directly facing a risky private goods allocation x i ∈ l + , agent i indirectly faces this risk via a risky period 2 aggregate endowment x ∈ l ++ that the planner allocates optimally among the agents using the Rawlsian criterion.
Example 7.12 Suppose X = l , O ⊂ l ++ and x ∈ O is the aggregate endowment of private goods in period 2. The planner allocates x among the agents. Given x, the set of feasible allocations is
The next example assumes that an agent's allocation in a given period consists of the planner's public good and a vector of other public goods; private goods are suppressed only for notational simplicity. Example 7.13 Suppose X = l , O ⊂ l + and x ∈ O is a vector of other public goods provided in period 2. Let f i (x) be agent i's valuation of x. Given f i as in Example 7.11, define v :
The next result allows the application of Theorem 7.1 to our examples. Lemma 7.14 In Examples 7.11-7.13, if O is compact, then v ∈ V .
Suppose O is compact. Then, v ∈ V by Lemma 7.14. Suppose w and φ are C 2 , D 2 w > 0, D 2 φ < 0, D 22 w < 0, D 1 w(v 1 , .) = 0 and D 21 w(., c) is C 1 for every c ∈ C. Then, u satisfies hypothesis (b) of Theorem 7.1.
If D 211 w ≥ 0, then Theorem 7.1 implies that, in all the above examples, the planner's optimal response to an increase in riskiness of the random outcome x ∈ O is to increase the second period public good allocation c.
Replacing the Rawlsian criterion with the Benthamite criterion, v in Examples 7.11-7.13 is given by v(x) = i∈I f i (x i ), v(x) = sup{ i∈I f i (x i ) | (x i ) i∈I ∈ S(x)} and v(x) = i∈I f i (x) respectively. It is easily confirmed that our result is preserved in these cases.
Moral hazard in teams
The following example provides a template for numerous moral hazard problems in team settings.
Consider a principal who might suffer a loss α > 0, say on account of an accident. The probability of loss is Q (v(x), c) , where c ∈ C = [a, b] is the precaution exercised by the principal, x = (x 1 , . . . , x n ) is the profile of precautions chosen by the n agents in the team and v(x) = min{x 1 , . . . , x n } is the effective precaution exercised by the agents. Suppose choosing precaution c imposes cost c on the principal. Thus, the principal selects c ∈ C to maximize O µ(r)(dx) u(v(x), c), where u(v, c) = −c − αQ(v, c) and µ(r) is the principal's belief about the precautions chosen by the agents.
Suppose 
Concluding remarks
Given any path-space, we have shown the equivalence of two criteria for comparing the riskiness of random processes that generate distributions over the given path-space; indeed, our main result yields many versions of this equivalence. This equivalence is a consequence of a more abstract result showing the equivalence of two criteria for comparing the riskiness of lotteries over any real vector space.
While one of the equivalent criteria is the decision-theoretic touchstone of the theory of comparative riskiness, the other criterion is very tractable in applications. We substantiate this claim by using the second criterion in six economic applications. We also generalize various supplementary results of the Rothschild-Stiglitz theory to vector outcomes settings.
A Appendix: Classical results
Consider Setting 3. A Markov kernel on O is a function P : O × B(O) → such that P (x, .) ∈ ∆(O) for every x ∈ O and P (., E) is measurable for every E ∈ B(O). A dilatation on O is a Markov kernel P on O such that f (.) = O P (., dx) f (x) for every continuous affine function f : O → .
Definition A.1 In Setting 3, given µ, λ ∈ ∆(O), we say that µ 3 λ if there is a dilatation P on O such that µ(.) = O λ(dx) P (x, .).
The following result is Theorem 2 in Strassen [28] .
Theorem A.2 In Setting 3,
In order to state the other equivalence result, we first define a martingale.
Definition A.3 Let X be a separable Banach space. An ordered pair (f, g) is an X-valued martingale if there is a probability space (Ω, F, Q) such that
Condition (a) means that f and g are Bochner integrable random elements with values in X. Condition (b) means that (σ(f ), σ(g)) is a filtration. By definition, (f, g) is adapted to this filtration. Condition (c) means that f is (a version of) the expectation of g conditional on f , i.e., f = E σ(f ) g. The following result is a consequence of Theorem 8 in Strassen [28] . Proof of Theorem 6.5 As V 1 is reflexive and transitive, so is . We show that is antisymmetric. Let 
Consider v ∈ V . By the definition of , we have µ V 1 λ and λ V 1 µ. Using Corollary 6.4, µ V 2 λ and λ V 2 µ. Therefore, c(y) :
for every y ∈ . Consequently, Dc(y) = 0 for every y ∈ . If y is a continuity point of F (.,
The set of such discontinuity points is countable (Billingsley [4] , Theorem 10.2). Consequently, there exists a sequence of continuity points (y n ) ⊂ (y, ∞) converging to y. As F (y n , µ • v −1 ) − F (y n , λ • v −1 ) = 0 for every n and distribution functions are right-continuous, we have
} is a λ-system (Billingsley [4] , Page 41). By the above argument, P ⊂ L. By Dynkin's theorem (Billingsley [4] Dunford and Schwartz [10] , Corollary V.2.13). So, if m µ exists, then it is unique. We now show that m µ ∈ O exists.
Define H : X → X * by H(x) = (h(x)) h∈X * . Give X * the product topology. H is continuous as all its component functions are continuous. If H(x) = H(y) for x, y ∈ X, then h(x − y) = h(x) − h(y) = 0 for every h ∈ X * , which implies x = y. So, H is injective. As O is compact and X * is Hausdorff, H imbeds O in X * . So, H(O) is closed in X * and metrizable.
Consider µ ∈ ∆(O) with finite support. The linearity of h ∈ X * implies
Setting m µ = z∈supp µ µ({z})z, we have m µ ∈ O as O is convex and supp µ ⊂ O. Thus, H(m µ ) ∈ H(O) for every µ ∈ ∆(O) with |supp µ| < ∞.
Consider µ ∈ ∆(O). As O is compact and metric, it is separable. Consequently, there exists a sequence (µ n ) ⊂ ∆(O) converging to µ in the C(O) topology such that |supp µ n | < ∞ for every n ∈ N (Parthasarathy [18] , Theorem II.6.3). 10 By the above argument, m µn exists, m µn ∈ O and H(m µn ) ∈ H(O) for every n ∈ N . Using (3) and the definition of convergence in the C(O) topology,
for every h ∈ X * . Thus, lim n↑∞ H(m µn ) = ( O µ(dz) h(z)) h∈X * . As the sequence (H(m µn )) ⊂ H(O) and H(O) is closed in X * and metrizable, we have ( O µ(dz) h(z)) h∈X * ∈ H(O). As H imbeds O in X * , there exists a 10 The C(O) topology is the weakest topology on ∆(O) that makes the functional µ → O µ(dx) f (x) continuous for every f ∈ C(O). It belongs to the class of weak* topologies in analysis and is usually called "the weak topology" in probability theory.
(B) Suppose µ Vc 1 λ. Consider h ∈ X * . It is straightforward to verify that the restrictions of h and −h to O belong to V c . It follows that µ As O is convex, it is connected. As v is continuous,
Consider a ∈ π(v, µ) and b ∈ π(v, λ). Since µ
Proof of Theorem 6.8 Consider x ∈ X and y ∈ X − {x}. Then, there is a continuous linear functional g : X → such that g(x) > g(y) (Dunford and Schwartz [10] , Corollary V.2.13). As g is continuous, U (y) := g −1 ((−∞, g(x))) is an open neighborhood of y that does not include x. So, X − {x} = ∪ y∈X−{x} U (y) is open in X. Therefore, {x} is closed in X for every x ∈ X.
As a is not injective, there exist x, y ∈ O such that x = y and a(x) = a(y). By the above argument, there is a continuous linear functional f : X → such that f (x) > f (y). The restrictions of f and −f to O belong to V c . As {x} and {y} are closed subsets of O, they are Borel sets. So, δ x , δ y ∈ ∆(O). As a is bounded, 
We shall verify these facts later.
Consider r ∈ [0, 1]. Given (ii), (b) and (c), D 2 U (r, c(r)) = 0 and D 22 U (r, c(r)) < 0. The implicit function theorem implies that c is C 1 in a neighborhood of r. Using (ii), D 21 U (r, c(r)) + D 22 U (r, c(r))Dc(r) = 0. Consequently, Dc(r) and D 21 U (r, c(r)) have the same sign.
Let (r, c) ∈ [0, 1] × C. Using (i) and integrating by parts, D 2 U (r, c) =
Integrating by parts and using (b), (r) ) ≥ 0 (resp. ≤ 0), and consequently, Dc(r) ≥ 0 (resp. ≤ 0). We now verify claims (i)-(iii).
(i) Using (a), (b) and Theorem XIII.7.1 in Lang [15] , φ is C 2 .
(
and analogous arguments applied to the component functions of 
Proof of Theorem 7.2 Specializing the proof of Theorem 7.1, we have 
Proof of Lemma 7.3 As β 0 ∈ + and β 1 ∈ , b is nonnegative and bounded.
Let
, b is increasing and therefore measurable.
Proof of Lemma 7.4 Suppose G is not strictly increasing on
every h ∈ B(C). As g ∈ B(C), L is continuous. By Alaoglu's theorem ( Dunford and Schwartz [10] , Theorem V.4.2), the closed unit sphere of ba(C) is compact. As ∆(C, c) is a subset of this sphere, it is compact if it is closed. Consider λ ∈ ba(C) that is an accumulation point of ∆(C, c). Then, there exists a net (λ n ) ⊂ ∆(C, c) converging to λ. By definition, lim n λ n (E) = lim n C λ n (dx) 1 E (x) = C λ(dx) 1 E (x) = λ(E) for every E ∈ B(C). Consequently, λ(∅) = 0, λ(C) = 1 and λ ≥ 0. Consider pairwise disjoint sets E 1 , . . . , E k ∈ B(C). Then, E = ∪ k i=1 E i ∈ B(C). As each λ n is finitely additive, we have λ(E) = lim n λ n (E) = lim n
λ(E i ). So, λ is finitely additive. As the identity map on C is bounded and measurable, it belongs to B(C) and c = lim n C λ n (dx) x = C λ(dx) x. Thus, λ ∈ ∆(C, c). So, ∆(C, c) is closed and therefore compact.
The compactness of ∆(C, c) and the continuity of L yield the result.
(B) As L is nonnegative and bounded, so is e. If c 1 , c 2 ∈ C and c 1 < c 2 , then {λ ∈ ∆(C) * | m λ ≥ c 2 } ⊂ {λ ∈ ∆(C) * | m λ ≥ c 1 }, and using Footnote 9, e(c 2 ) = inf{L(λ) | λ ∈ ∆(C) * ∧ m λ ≥ c 2 } ≥ inf{L(λ) | λ ∈ ∆(C) * ∧ m λ ≥ c 1 } = e(c 1 ).
Consider c 1 , c 2 ∈ C, t ∈ (0, 1) and c = tc 1 + (1 − t)c 2 . By (A), there exists λ 1 ∈ ∆(C, c 1 ) * and λ 2 ∈ ∆(C, c 2 ) * such that e(c 1 ) = L(λ 1 ) and e(c 2 ) = L(λ 2 ). Set λ = tλ 1 + (1 − t)λ 2 . Since m λ = tm λ 1 + (1 − t)m λ 2 = tc 1 + (1 − t)c 2 = c, we have λ ∈ ∆(C, c) * . It follows that e(c) ≤ L(λ) = tL(λ 1 ) + (1 − t)L(λ 2 ) = te(c 1 ) + (1 − t)e(c 2 ). Thus, e is a convex function.
Continuity of e on (0, 1) follows from Theorem 7 on page 193 of Berge [3] . The Busemann-Feller-Alexandrov theorem (see Fleming and Soner [11] ) implies that e is twice differentiable Lebesgue almost everywhere. 
and η is given by η(x) = 1 − x 2 . Using the chain-rule, as η is C ∞ , it suffices to show that φ is C ∞ . As preparation, we note two facts. First, for n ∈ N , it is easily verified that D n φ(y) = p n (y)φ(y)y −2n , if y > 0 0, if y < 0
where p n (y) is the polynomial of degree n − 1 generated by the recursive rule: p 1 (y) = 1 and p k+1 (y) = y 2 Dp k (y) − (2ky − 1)p k (y) for k ∈ N . Second, consider y > 0 and n ∈ N ∪ {0}. Using the power series representation of e 1/y , we have the estimate 0 ≤ y −n = yy −(n+1) ≤ y(n + 1)!e 1/y . Thus, 0 ≤ lim y↓0 e −1/y y −n ≤ lim y↓0 y(n + 1)! = 0, i.e., lim y↓0 φ(y)y −n = 0.
Setting n = 0 implies that lim y↓0 φ(y) = 0. Using (4), φ is continuous. Now consider Example 7.12. Clearly, S has nonempty values. Consider a sequence (x n ) n∈N ⊂ O and a family of sequences {(x i n ) n∈N ⊂ l + | i ∈ I} such that lim n x n = x, lim n x i n = x i for every i ∈ I and x n = i∈I x i n for every n ∈ N . Clearly, (x i n ) i∈I ∈ S(x n ) for every n ∈ N . It follows that x ∈ O, x i ∈ l + for every i ∈ I and x = i∈I x i . It follows that (x i ) i∈I ∈ S(x). Thus, S has a closed graph, and therefore, closed values. As O is compact, there exists y ∈ ( l + ) I such that S(x) is a subset of the compact set {z ∈ ( l ) I | 0 ≤ z ≤ y} for every x ∈ O. Therefore, S is upper hemicontinuous (Berge [3] , Theorem VI.1.7) and has compact values.
We now confirm that S is lower hemicontinuous. Fix x ∈ O and (x i ) i∈I ∈ S(x). By definition, 0 x = i∈I x i ; therefore, π j (x) > 0 for every j ∈ {1, . . . , l}. Consider a sequence (x n ) n∈N ⊂ O converging to x. We need to construct a family of sequences {(x i n ) n∈N ⊂ l + | i ∈ I} such that (a) i∈I x i n = x n for every n ∈ N , and (b) lim n x i n = x i for every i ∈ I. For j ∈ {1, . . . , l} and n ∈ N , let λ j n = π j (x n )/π j (x). As lim n x n = x, we have lim n π j (x n ) = π j (x) and lim n λ j n = 1 for every j ∈ {1, . . . , l}. Let x i n = (λ 1 n π 1 (x i ), . . . , λ l n π l (x i )). Then, x i n ∈ l + and lim n x i n = x i for every i ∈ I. For j ∈ {1, . . . , l}, we have i∈I λ j n π j (x i ) = λ j n π j ( i∈I x i ) = λ j n π j (x). It follows that i∈I x i n = ( i∈I λ 1 n π 1 (x i ), . . . , i∈I λ l n π l (x i )) = (λ 1 n π 1 (x), . . . , λ l n π l (x)) = (π 1 (x n ), . . . , π l (x n )) = x n , as required. As S is continuous and has nonempty compact values, v is continuous (Berge [3] , Maximum theorem, Pg. 116).
Consider x, y ∈ O and t ∈ (0, 1). Then, tx + (1 − t)y ∈ O. Using (A) and the fact that S has nonempty compact values, we conclude that v(x) = min{f i (x i ) | i ∈ I}, v(y) = min{f i (y i ) | i ∈ I} and v(tx + (1 − t)y) = min{f i (z i ) | i ∈ I} for some (x i ) i∈I ∈ S(x), (y i ) i∈I ∈ S(y) and (z i ) i∈I ∈ S(tx + (1 − t)y). Since (tx i + (1 − t)y i ) i∈I ∈ S(tx + (1 − t)y), (7) implies that v is concave as v(tx + (1 − t)y) = min{f i (z i ) | i ∈ I} ≥ min{f i (tx i + (1 − t)y i ) | i ∈ I} ≥ tv(x) + (1 − t)v(y)
In Example 7.13, v is continuous and concave by an argument analogous to that used for Example 7.11.
